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Abstract—Our aim in this paper is to investigate the 
profitability of double-spending (DS) attacks that manipulate a 
priori mined transaction in a blockchain. Up to date, it was 
understood that the requirement for successful DS attacks is to 
occupy a higher proportion of computing power than a target 
network’s proportion; i.e., to occupy more than 51% 
proportion of computing power. On the contrary, we show that 
DS attacks using less than 50% proportion of computing power 
can also be vulnerable. Namely, DS attacks using any 
proportion of computing power can occur as long as the chance 
to making a good profit is there; i.e., revenue of an attack is 
greater than the cost of launching it. We have novel probability 
theory based derivations for calculating time finite attack 
probability. This can be used to size up the resource needed to 
calculate the revenue and the cost. The results enable us to 
derive sufficient and necessary conditions on the value of a 
target transaction which make DS attacks for any proportion of 
computing power profitable. They can also be used to assess the 
risk of one’s transaction by checking whether or not the 
transaction value satisfies the conditions for profitable DS 
attacks. Two examples are provided in which we evaluate the 
attack resources and the conditions for profitable DS attacks 
given 35% proportion of computing power against Syscoin and 
BitcoinCash networks, and quantitatively shown how 
vulnerable they are. 
Index Terms— Blockchain, Bitcoin, Double-Spending Attack, 
Profit, Gambler’s Ruin Theorem, Poisson Counting Process. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
blockchain is a distributed ledger which has originated 
from a desire to find a novel alternative to centralized 
ledgers such as transactions through third parties [1]. Besides 
the role as a ledger, a blockchain has been applied to many 
areas, e.g., managing the access authority to shared data in 
the cloud network [2] and averting collusion in e-Auction [3]. 
In a blockchain network based on the proof-of-work (PoW) 
mechanism, each peer node who ever has downloaded and 
installed the pertinent full blockchain protocol suite can join 
as a full node for the network. Full nodes, or the so-called 
miners, verify transactions, put them into a block, and mold 
the block to a chain by solving a cryptographic puzzle. 
Specifically, a transaction is put into a block by a single full 
node which solves the cryptographic puzzle for the first time 
among all full nodes in competition. The reward of minting a 
certain amount of coins and paid to its own address is given to 
the first puzzle solver as motivation to join and remain in the 
network. As a result, transactions are verified by many 
decentralized full nodes in the network. A number of other 
researchers [4], [5], [6] have analyzed the winning of rewards 
under various specific assumptions using game theory. 
A consensus mechanism is programmed for decentralized 
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peers in a network to share a common chain. If a full node 
succeeds in generating a new block, he/she has the latest 
version of the chain. All of the nodes in the network 
continuously communicate with each other to share the latest 
chain. If a node suffers from a conflict between two or more 
different chains, the consensus rule provides a rule that a 
single chain is selected. Satoshi Nakamoto suggested the 
longest chain consensus for Bitcoin protocol which conserves 
the longest chain among the conflictions [1]. There are also 
other consensus rules [7], e.g., GHOST [8]. 
Blockchains are motivated by the trust enabled by 
decentralized nodes. However, the decentralization 
mechanism is unfortunately prone to break down [9]. The 
PoW race is for a full node game of solving a cryptographic 
puzzle faster than others. As such, a node may form a pool of 
computing chips to increase the chance to win the PoW race. 
The problem is that a very limited number of pools occupy a 
major proportion of the computing power which operates the 
network. For example, the pie chart shown in Fig.  1 
illustrates the proportion of computing power in the Bitcoin 
network as of October 2018. In the chart, five pools such as 
BTC.com, AntPool, ViaBTC, F2Pool, and BTC.TOP occupy 
a dominant proportion of the computing power. That is to say, 
they have recentralized the Bitcoin network [10]. 
Double-spending (DS) is one type of attacks made easily 
probable in a recentralized network. Since a few full nodes 
can easily occupy a sufficient proportion of computing power 
of the blockchain network, they are able to manipulate 
already confirmed transactions. Suppose that a public chain 
contains a target transaction which transfers the ownership 
of a certain amount of cryptocurrency from the attacker to a 
merchant for the price of a certain goods and service. Before 
shipping the goods, a careful merchant will wait until the 
transaction has been verified in a number of block 
confirmations by normal peers. We call this process block 
confirmation. At the same time, an attacker with a high 
computing power confidentially develops a fraudulent chain 
Profitable Double-Spending Attacks  
Jehyuk Jang and Heung-No Lee, Senior Member, IEEE 
A
 
Fig.  1. Computation power distribution among the largest mining pools 
provided by blockchain.com (date accessed: 22 Oct. 2018). 
aimed at nullifying the target transaction in the public chain. 
After obtaining the block confirmation and making the 
fraudulent chain longer than the public one, the attacker then 
publicly announces the fraudulent chain. The consensus rule 
is to trust the longer chain, so the normal miners accept the 
fraudulent chain and discard the shorter public chain. Indeed, 
there have been a number of reports that cryptocurrencies 
such as BitcoinGold, ZenCash, Zcash, and Litecoin Cash 
suffered from DS attacks and millions of US dollars were lost 
in 2018 [11], [12], [13]. 
Recentralization is not the only concern for DS attacks. 
The advent of rental services which lend computing 
equipment for DS attacks can be a major concern as well [14]. 
Recently, rental services such as nicehash.com which provide 
a brokerage service between the suppliers and the consumers 
have indeed become available. The concern at hand is then to 
determine whether or not attacking with a rented computing 
power really returns a profit. The next concern is to find a 
strategy for such an attack. 
Success by making DS attacks is possible but is believed 
to be difficult for a public blockchain with a large pool of 
mining network support. Nakamoto and Rosenfield provided 
probabilistic results of DS attack success (AS) in [1] and [15], 
respectively, using gambler’s ruin analysis. They showed that 
the condition guaranteeing for making a successful DS attack 
is for the attacker to bring in a computing power more than 
the computing power which is already invested to operate the 
network; such an attack is thus called 51% attack. This result 
has been considered as the requirement for AS. This 
conclusion however shall be reconsidered given our result in 
the sequel that there are significant chances of making a good 
profit from DS attacks regardless of the proportion of 
computing power. 
In this paper, our aim is to include profitability and find 
the requirements for DS attacks to be profitable. In our model, 
a DS attack succeeds if three conditions are achieved: i) block 
confirmation should be realized; ii) the fraudulent chain 
should be longer than the public chain; and iii) both 
conditions i) and ii) should be satisfied within a cut time. 
A. Contributions 
We show that attackers can expect a profitable DS attack 
not only in the super-50% proportion regime but also in the 
sub-50% proportion regime where computing power invested 
by the attacker is smaller than that invested by a target 
network. A DS attack is profitable if and only if the 
expectation of a profit function defined in (38) is positive. 
To define a profit function, we introduce a novel set of 
mathematical tools. Specifically, we compute the probability 
distribution of the time spent for an AS. This AS time 
incorporates the probability of all possible AS within a cut 
time. The derivation of probability distribution enables us to 
draw results on expected revenue. Also, the expectation of 
AS time is used to compute expected expense spent for an 
attack attempt. As a result, the profit is the difference 
between the expected revenue and the expected expense. 
We show that for a DS attack in the sub-50% proportion 
regime to be profitable, it is necessary to set the cut time to be 
finite. Otherwise, if an AS never be achieved, infinite deficit 
can happen. Under any finite cut time, we provide a condition 
on the value of target transaction which suffices a profitable 
DS attack. 
Using these results, we provide examples of resources 
required for profitable attacks against BitcoinCash and 
Syscoin, as of December 2018 (see Section IV-B for details). 
Suppose that 35% proportion of computing powers is 
available, and the block confirmation number is 5. To 
compute the expected expense, we referred to the rental fee of 
computing power from nicehash.com. In the case of Syscoin, 
the expected expense is 1.810 BTC and the required value of 
the target transaction is 13.134 BTC. The expected AS time is 
around 9 minutes. In the case of BitcoinCash, the expected 
expense is 2.844 BTC and the required value of the target 
transaction is 20.639 BTC. The expected AS time is 1 hour 
31 minutes. 
B. Related Works 
References [15] and [16] have analyzed the profitability 
of DS attacks in terms of revenue and opportunity cost. 
Opportunity cost is the expected rewards that could be paid 
out from normal mining and is generally a function of the 
time spent for an attack attempt. However, Rosenfield 
assumed the attack time to be a fixed number for the simple 
calculation of opportunity cost [15], while to simplify the 
estimation of attack time, Bissias et al. included an 
assumption that the attack stops if either the normal peers or 
the attacker achieves the block confirmation first [16]. On the 
contrary, in our model, an attack can be continued 
indefinitely if it brings a profit, even if the normal peers 
achieve block confirmation before the attacker does. 
Budish conducted simulations on the profitability of DS 
attacks using more than 50% proportion of computing power 
[17]. He provided an empirical condition on the value of the 
target transaction that makes DS attacks not profitable. On 
the contrary, we consider not only the super-50% proportion 
regime but also the sub-50% proportion regime. We provide 
mathematical formulas for the required resources as 
functions of the computing power and block confirmation 
number. We also provide practical examples of profitable DS 
attacks against working blockchain networks. 
The web-site Crypto51.app lists hourly rental fees for 50% 
proportion of computing power for the purpose of estimating 
the profit from DS attacks. However, there is no estimation of 
the AS time, and thus the estimation of the total cost is absent. 
The probability distribution of AS time was analyzed in 
[18] and [19]. However, none of the results matched with our 
three conditions for AS. Specifically, neither analysis 
considered the first condition: i) block confirmation should 
be realized. We compare these results with ours in Section 
III-D in detail. 
C. Organization of the Paper 
Section II contains definitions of the three conditions 
required for a successful DS attack. DS attacks are modeled 
by the random walk of two independent Poisson counting 
processes (PCPs). Section III comprises the computation of 
the probabilities of DS AS and the stochastic behaviors of the 
first time when the DS attack is successful. In Section IV, we 
analyze the profitability of DS attacks, followed by providing 
the resources required to make them profitable. Finally, 
Section V concludes the paper with a summary. 
II. THE ATTACK MODEL 
Here, we define the conditions for a successful DS attack. 
DS attacks are modeled with two independent PCPs. The 
PCP events are carefully enumerated to account for the AS. 
A. Attack Scenario 
We consider blockchain networks which adopt the 
longest chain consensus. The longest one wins among all of 
the chains in competition. We assume there are two groups of 
miners, the normal group of miners and a single attacker. The 
normal group tends the public chain. 
When the attacker decides to launch a DS attack, he/she 
issues a target transaction for the payment of goods or 
services to transfer the ownership of the cryptocurrency from 
the attacker him/herself to the victimized counterpart (VC). 
However, the attacker does not announce the target 
transaction to the normal group immediately but waits for a 
new block generation in the public chain. We denote the time 
at which this new block is generated as 0t = . At time 0t = , 
the attacker announces the target transaction to normal group 
so that normal group starts to put it into the public chain. At 
the same time, the attacker makes a fork of the public chain 
which stems from the newest block generated at 0t =  and 
builds it in secret. We refer to this secret fork as fraudulent 
chain. In the fraudulent chain, the target transaction is altered 
in a way that deceives the counterpart and benefits the 
attacker; one such an example is to get rid of any record of the 
target transaction after receiving the goods or services. 
Before shipping goods or providing services to the attacker, 
the VC obviously chooses to wait for a few more blocks in 
addition to the block on which the target transaction has been 
entered. The number of blocks the VC chooses to wait for is 
referred to as the block confirmation number BCN
+Î¢ in this 
paper. Note that the number BCN  includes the block on 
which the target transaction is entered. 
The attacker chooses to make the fraudulent chain public if 
his attack was successful. An attack is successful if the 
fraudulent chain is longer than the public chain after the 
moment the block confirmation is satisfied. This is possible 
because the public chain is always publicly open, while the 
fraudulent one is kept private by the attacker. However, the 
attacker will not wait for his success indefinitely since 
growing the attacker’s chain incurs the expense per time 
spent for operating the computing power. The attack thus 
stops if the attack does not succeed within a cut time cutt  to 
cut loss. 
To sum up, the AS of the DS attack is declared if all of the 
following conditions ( )1G , ( )2G , and ( )3G  are satisfied. 
Definition 1. A DS attack succeeds if 
1. ( )1G : the length of public chain counting from the 
moment  0t =  grows greater than or equal to BCN ,  
2. ( )2G : the length of fraudulent chain counting from 
the moment 0t =  grows longer than the public 
chain, and 
3. ( )3G : starting from 0t = , the duration ( ) ( )1 , 2T  at 
which both ( )1G  and ( )2G  are satisfied for the first 
time is less than cutt . 
When the cut time of attack is set to infinite cutt = ¥ , such an 
attack success is called attack success with the infinite cut 
time (AS-ICT). 
B. The Stochastic Model 
We model the length of the public chain and that of the 
fraudulent chain by two independent PCPs ( )H t  with 
parameter Hl  (blocks per second) and ( )A t  with parameter 
Al , respectively. Both processes start at the zero state 
( ) ( )0 0 0H A= =  and independently increase by at most 1 at a 
time. An increment of 1 in the counting process occurs when 
the pertinent network adds a new block to its chain and the 
chain length is grown by 1 unit with each new mining 
success. 
We rewrite the events AS and AS-ICT in terms of ( )H t  
and ( )A t . In Definition 1, the first two conditions ( )1G  and 
( )2G  are expressed by ( ) BCH t N³  and ( ) ( )A t H t> , 
respectively. It is convenient to define the time ( ) ( )1 , 2T  at 
which both ( )1G  and ( )2￿G  are satisfied first as follow: 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ } { }{ }1 , 2 : inf 0, : ; .BCT t H t N A t H t= Î ¥ ³ > ¥U  (1) 
 
From the last condition ( )3G , the event AS-ICT is declared if 
( ) ( )1 , 2T < ¥ . Similarly, for a finite cutt < ¥ , the event AS is 
declared if ( ) ( )1 , 2 cutT t< . 
To simplify ( )1G  and ( )2￿G , we form a random walk that 
represents the difference between ( )A t  and ( )H t . For this 
purpose, we first define two continuous stochastic processes 
( )M t  and ( )S t , which are respectively defined as 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ): ,M t H t A t= +  (2) 
and 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ): .S t H t A t= -  (3) 
 
The first process ( )M t  is also a PCP [20] with the rate 
 
 ( ):  blocks per second ,T A Hl l l= +  (4) 
 
which corresponds to the sum of computing powers of the 
two mining groups. The second process ( )S t  is the 
continuous-time analog of a random walk. We define a 
random walk iS Î¢  for i +ÎZ  as  
 
 ( ): ,i iS S T=  (5) 
 
where iT  is the state progression time of iS  defined by 
 
 ( ){ }:= inf  :  .iT t M t i+Î =¡  (6) 
 
Random walk iS  is a stationary Markov chain starting from 
0 0S = . The state transition probabilities from 1iS -  to iS  
equals the probabilities that a point arrival of ( )M t  comes 
from either ( )H t  or ( )A t . Specifically, the state transition 
probabilities are written as 
 
 ( )1: Pr 1| ,AA i i
T
p S n S n l
l-
= = + = =  (7) 
and 
 ( )1: Pr 1| ,HH i i
T
p S n S n l
l-
= = - = =  (8) 
 
for all i +Î¢  and nÎ¢ . The state transition probabilities Hp  
and Ap  are the proportions of computing power occupied by 
the normal miners and that by the attacker, respectively.  
We define the independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) 
state transition random variables { } ( )1 ~Bernoullii HpD Î ±  as 
 
 1: ,i i iS S -D = -  (9) 
for i +Î¢ . 
Using the random walk, we can rewrite ( ) ( )1 , 2T  as 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ){ } { }{ }1 , 2 min : ; 0, .i i BC iT T H T N S i += ³ < " Î ¥¢ U  (10) 
 
C. Event sets of random walk 
We aim to construct the event sets of state transitions iD  
which imply the satisfaction of the two conditions in (10): 
( )i BCH T N³  (i.e., ( )1G ) and 0iS <  (i.e., ( )2G ). 
For the purpose, we define a DS attack as random 
experiment ( ), ;I A cut BCp t N=Δ A  which produces random 
binary sequence ( ) { }1: , , 1 II i= D D Î ±Δ L  of the state 
transitions in (9) with random length I +Î¢ . The 
experimental output is an element of universal set U  of 
sequences, which is defined as 
  
 { }
1 1
: 1 ,ii
i i
¥ ¥
= =
= = ±U￿ UU U  (10) 
 
where { }: 1 ii = ±U . We define ( )1: , ,i i id d= Îδ UL  as a 
binary sequence of length i , which is the realization of IΔ . 
We denote 
1
: kk lls d==å  for integer k +Î¢ , which comprises 
observations of the state variables kS  of the random walk. 
We denote the event sets  i iÌW U , for i +Î¢ , each of 
which satisfies ( )1G  and ( )2G  at the i-th state for the first time. 
The time ( ) ( )1 , 2T  in (10) then can be rewritten as 
 
 ( ) ( ) { } { }{ }1 , 2 min : , .i I iT T i += Î " Î ¥Δ W ¢ U  (11) 
 
To construct iW , we divide it into mutually exclusive sets 
( )1
jD  and ( ) ( )2 1,j i -D , for 1, ,j i= L . 
Set ( )1jD  is a subset of iU  such that ( )1G  is satisfied 
exactly at the j -th state jS . One of the requirements on the 
binary sequences of ( )1jD  is 2j BCs N j= -  since the first j  
transitions kd  for 1, ,k j= L  have BCN  number of 1+ ’s  
and BCj N-  number of 1- ’s.  
Set ( ) ( )2 1,j i
-D  for j i£  is a subset of iU  such that ( )2G  is 
satisfied for the first time at the i -th state and ( )1G  is satisfied 
already at state j  prior or equal to state i . This set does not 
care about the first j  transitions kd  for 1, ,k j= L , but only 
focuses on the interim transitions from the 1j + -th to the i
-th, i.e. md , for 1, ,m j i= + L . Recall that satisfying ( )1G  at 
state j  implies 2j BCs N j= - . Thus, the requirement for the 
elements of ( ) ( )2 1,j i
-D  is that the state changes from starting 
state 2j BCs N j= -   to  state 1is = - , while any interim state 
ks remains non-negative; i.e., 0ks ³  for each 
1, , 1k j i= + -L . 
The elements of joint set ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1,j j i
-D DI  for j i£  satisfy 
both ( )1G  at state j  and ( )2G  at state i . When j i> , the 
elements of ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1,j j i
-D DI  does not imply achieving ( )1G  and 
( )2G  at the i -th state, since no confirmation has been 
obtained yet. Namely, achieving ( )1G  and ( )2G  is possible at a 
state only posterior to the state at which ( )1G  is satisfied. 
When BCj N< , 
( )1
j f=D  due to an insufficient number of 
state transitions for the block confirmation. Subsequently, 
iW  is written as 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1, .
BC
i
i j j i
j N
-
=
=W D DIU  (12) 
 
We further explore (12). Remember that in the first j  
transitions of ( )1jD , the number of 1+ ’s is fixed to BCN  and 
the rests of BCj N-  transitions are 1- ’s. This implies that 
for 2 BCj N> , js   in 
( )1
jD  are already negative. Equivalently, 
for 2 BCj N> , elements in 
( )1
jD  satisfy both ( )1G  and ( )2G  at 
state j . Analogously, ( ) ( )2 1,j i f
- =D  for 2 BCj N>  and j i< , 
since the state 2j BCs N j= -  contradicts the requirement of 
( ) ( )2 1
,j i
-D : the interim transactions between js  and is  should 
be non-negative. For 2 BCj N>  and j i= , set 
( ) ( )2 1
,j i
-D  about 
interim states ks , for 1, , 1k j i= + -L , equals set iU  since 
there is no interim state to apply the requirement to. This 
implies ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )1 2 1 1,j j i i- =D D DI  for 2 BCj N>  and j i= . 
As a result, (12) becomes 
 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2
1 2 1 1
, , for 2 ,
, for 2 .
BC
BC
N
j j i i BC
i j N
BC
i N
i Nf
-
=
ìæ ö
>ïç ÷ç ÷=íè øï £î
D D DW I UU  (13) 
 
For example, suppose 2BCN = , then a sequence 
( )5 1, 1, 1, 1, 1= - + + - -Δ  satisfies ( )1G  at state index 3j = . 
After the 3-rd index, 5Δ  satisfies 
( )2G  at 5i = , thus 
( ) ( ) ( )( )1 2 15 3 3,5 5-Î ÌΔ D D WI . The other example is a sequence 
( )5 1, 1, 1, 1, 1= - - + - +Δ , which satisfies ( )1G  at 5j =  for the 
first time. In addition, at the same state index, the sequence 
5Δ  satisfies 
( )2G  as well. Hence, ( )15 5 5Î ÌΔ D W . It is easy 
to check that for all 2 BCj N> , the sequences which satisfy 
( )1G  at the j -th state index for the first time satisfy ( )2G  as 
well at the same state index, and thus are the elements of iW . 
As a counterexample, a sequence ( )4 1, 1, 1, 1= - - + +Δ  
satisfies ( )1G  at the 4-th state index, but never satisfies ( )2G  
due to the number of state transitions being insufficient. 
The sets iW  for i +Î¢  are mutually exclusive since the 
lengths of the sequences comprising these differ by i . Thus, 
for DS attack ( ), ;I A cut BCp t N=Δ A , if i  exists such that 
I iÎΔ W , for i +ÎZ , then it is unique, which implies that the 
expression for ( ) ( )1 , 2T  in (11) can be rewritten as 
 
 ( ) ( )1 , 2 ,  : , ,
, .
i I iT if i iT
otherwise
+ì $ Î " Î=í¥î
Δ ZW   (14) 
III. AS PROBABILITIES 
For a DS attack task ( ), ;I A cut BCp t N=Δ A , we aim to 
compute the probability of AS, which equals the probability 
that the AS conditions ( )1G  and ( )2G  have met within the 
time duration cutt ; i.e., 
( ) ( )1 , 2
cutT t< . This probability requires 
the probability density function (PDF) of ( ) ( )1 , 2T , which also 
enables to compute the expectation of the time at which a DS 
attack succeeds, i.e., expected AS time. 
The probabilities and expectations in this section will be 
used to evaluate the profitability of DS attacks in Section IV. 
A. AS-ICT Probability 
We first compute the probability of AS-ICT with cutt = ¥ . 
The probability of AS-ICT is the probability that the state 
index i  exists such that I iÎΔ W , and thus requires  
( )Pr I iÎΔ W . Note that no occurrence of AS-ICT with 
infinite cutt  implies no occurrence of AS with a finite cutt  as 
well. That is to say, the probability of AS-ICT is also needed 
to compute the probability of AS. 
In specific, from the mutual exclusiveness of iW  for 
i +Î¢ , the probability AS ICT-P  of AS-ICT equals the sum of 
( )Pr I iÎΔ W , for i +Î¢ . Since i f=W , for 2 BCi N£ , as 
given in (13), it can be computed as 
 
 ( ) ( )
2 1
; Pr .
BC
AS ICT A BC I i
i N
p N
¥
-
= +
= Îå ΔP W  (15) 
 
The following Proposition 2 gives the probability 
( )Pr I iÎΔ W  used in (15). 
Proposition 2. Consider DS attack task 
( ), ;I A cut BCp t N=Δ A , then the probability that  ( )Pr I iÎΔ W , 
for 2 BCi N> , can be computed as 
 
 
( )
1 12
2 2
1 ,2
2
Pr
1             1
1                       + ,1
BC
BC BC
BC
BC BC
I i
i ij N
i A HN N jBCj N
N i N
H A
BC
j C p pN
i p pN
+ -=
- - -=
-
Î
-æ ö= ç ÷-è ø
-æ ö
ç ÷-è ø
å
Δ W
 (16) 
where  
 { },
1 2 , , 0 ,
1
0, ,
n m
m n m n mC nn m
otherwise
++ì +æ ö Îï ç ÷= + +í è ø
ïî
Z U  (17) 
 
and for 2 BCi N£ , ( )Pr 0I iÎ =Δ W . 
Proof: As given in (13), set iW  is the union of 
( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1
,j j i
-D DI ,
 
for , ,2BC BCj N N= L  and ( )1iD . As sets ( )1jD , 
for , ,2BC BCj N N= L , are mutually exclusive by definition, 
the probability of the union of ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1,j j i
-D DI , for 
, ,2BC BCj N N= L , and 
( )1
iD  equals the sum of the respective 
probabilities. In addition, for every 2 1BCi N³ +  and j , 
( )1
jD  
and ( ) ( )2 1,j i
-D  are independent since the requirements for the 
two sets focus on the different indices of the state transitions. 
Thus, the probability of intersections ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1,j j i
-D DI  equals 
the product of the respective probabilities. As a result, from 
(13), ( )Pr I iÎΔ W  for 2 BCi N> can be computed as 
 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )( )
2
1 2 1
,
1
Pr Pr Pr
                     Pr .
BC
BC
j N
I i I j I j i
j N
I i
=
-
=
Î = Î Î
+ Î
åΔ Δ Δ
Δ
W D D
D
 (18) 
 
By definition, set ( )1jD  picks 1BCN -  transitions among 
the first 1j-  transitions. The picked transitions are given 1+
s and the rests are given 1- s. The j -th transition is 1jD = . 
The probability ( )( )1Pr jD  equals the point mass function of a 
negative binomial distribution: 
 
 ( )( )1 1Pr .1 BC BCN j Nj H ABC
j p pN
--æ ö=ç ÷-è ø
D  (19) 
 
Computing the probability ( ) ( )( )2 1,Pr j i -D  starts from 
counting the number of elements in ( ) ( )2 1,j i
-D . Remember the 
requirements on every element of ( ) ( )2 1,j i
-D , for 
, , 2BC BCj N N= L , are that the states change starting from 
state 2j BCs N j= -  and ending with state 0is <  while 
keeping 0ks ³ , for 1, , 1k j i= + -L . The i -th transition 
should be 1iD =- . The number of elements in 
( ) ( )2 1
,j i
-D  equals 
the ballot number [21], which is the number of random walks 
that consist of 1i j- -  steps and never become negative, 
starting from point 2 BCN j-  at the j -th state and ending at 
the origin with the 1i - -th state. This number is given as 
,n mC  in (17) with relationships 2 1n m i j+ = - -  and 
2 BCm N j= - . As a result, by multiplying the probabilities of 
state transitions, the probability ( ) ( )( )2 1,Pr j i -D  is computed as 
 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )2 1 1, ,Pr .n m nj i n m A HC p p- + +=D  (20) 
 
Finally, substituting (19) and (20) into (18) results in (16).
 ■ 
The following Corollary 3 gives an explicit formula of the 
probability AS ICT-P  of AS-ICT given in (15). 
Corollary 3. The probability AS ICT-P  has an algebraic 
expression 
 
( )
2
1
;
1, ,
1      1 , ,1
BC
BC BC
BC
AS ICT A BC
H A
N
N N
A H j H A
BCj N
p N
p p
jp p A p pN
-
+
=
=
£ì
ï -æ öí - >ç ÷ï -è øî
å
P
 (21) 
where 
 2 1 2 1.BC BCj N j Nj A HA p p
- - - --@  (22) 
 
Proof: See Appendix A 
B. AS Probability 
By Definition 1, the probability of AS equals 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 , 2, ; : Pr .AS A cut BC cutp t N T t= <P  (23) 
 
To compute ASP , we need the probability density function 
(PDF) of ( ) ( )1 , 2T . From the mutual exclusiveness of iW  for 
integers 2 BCi N>  and the relationship in (14), the PDF 
( ) ( )1 , 2T
f  can be computed as 
 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 , 2
2 1
Pr
              1 ,
i
BC
I i TT
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AS ICT
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td
¥
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= Î
+ - - ¥
å Δ
P
W
 (24) 
 
where ( )td  is a Dirac delta function and ( )
iT
f t  is the PDF 
of iT . The random variable iT  in (6) follows an Erlang 
distribution with shape parameter i  and rate Tl  [20]. The 
PDF of iT  is thus given as 
 
 ( ) ( )( )
1
.
1 !
T
i
i t
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T
t e
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i
ll l - -
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-
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Proposition 4. The PDF of time ( ) ( )1 , 2T  has a closed-form 
expression: 
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where ( ); ;p qF xa b  is the generalized hypergeometric 
function [22] defined in Appendix E with the parameter 
vectors 
 
 1 21 2 2
BC
BC
N j
N j
+ -é ù=ê ú+ -ë û
a  (27) 
and 
 
2 2
1 .
1 2
BC
BC
BC
N j
N
N
+ -é ù
ê ú= +ê ú+ë û
b  (28) 
 
Proof: See Appendix B. 
 
C. Expected AS Times 
It will be shown to be convenient to define the AS time as 
 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 , 2 1 , 2,  ,:
not defined, .
cut
AS
T if T tT
otherwise
ì <ï= í
ïî
 (29) 
 
The case for AS cutT t>  does not need to be defined since it is 
not useful. 
The PDF of AST  is just a scaled version of ( ) ( ) ( )1 , 2Tf t  for 
0 cutt t< < , which is given in (26), with a scaling factor of 
1
AS
-P  . Formally, the PDF ( )
AST
f t  equals 
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The expectation of AS time (EAST) is computed as 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )
1 , 20, ; .
, ;
cut
AS
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T
T A cut BC
AS A cut BC
tf t dt
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p t N
= òE P  (31) 
 
Similarly, we define AS-ICT time as the AS time with 
cutt =¥ . From the results (24) and (31), if cutt = ¥ , the 
expectation of the time for AS-ICT is computed as follow  
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where [ ] 1i TE T il -=  [20]. 
The following Proposition 5 gives an explicit formula of 
AS ICTT -
E . 
Proposition 5. Let ( ): max ,M A Hp p p=  and 
( ): min ,m A Hp p p= , then the expectation AS ICTT -E  has a 
closed-form expression: 
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Proof: See Appendix A. 
 
D. Comparison with Previous Works 
The AS-ICT probability AS ICT-P  (AS probability when 
indefinite cut time cutt =¥  is given) in Corollary 3 was 
computed by Nakamoto [1] and Rosenfield [15] using the 
gambler’s ruin theorem [23]. In [1], Nakamoto suggested an 
additional assumption not in our scenario: the time spent for 
the first BCN  blocks mined by the normal group is not 
random and is determined as the average time 1H BCNl -
instead. In other words, the block confirmation process was 
not treated as the stochastic processes. In [15], Rosenfield 
removed the assumption proposed by Nakamoto to derive the 
result in Corollary 3. However, the result was still based on 
the gambler’s ruin theorem which only computes the 
asymptotical behavior of nS  as n®¥  by manipulating the 
recurrence relationship between two adjacent states. That is 
to say, he assumed that an indefinite number of attack 
chances are given to the attacker. There was no result related 
to the intermediate process such as Proposition 2. 
In this paper, we introduce cutt , which generalize the 
results by Nakamoto and Rosenfield, and compute the AS 
probability ASP  using Proposition 2. In practice, attack 
chances are limited since the amount of resources such as 
time and cost are limited, and therefore a cut time cutt  is 
needed to cut loss. 
Besides the probability 
AS ICTT -
P , the probability 
distribution of attack success time similar with ( ) ( )1 , 2T  was 
also analyzed in [16], [18], and [19]. However, none of the 
results matched with the AS conditions in Definition 1. 
In [18], Goffard considered the race between two PCPs 
( )H t  and ( )A t  with unfair initial states. Specifically, the 
initial states of the public chain ( )H t  and the fraudulent 
chain were set to ( )0H z=  and ( )0 0A =  for integer 0z > , 
respectively, then an implicit expression of the probability 
distribution of first time zt  at which ( ) ( )z zH At t=  was 
analyzed. Time zt  can be interpreted as the interval spent for 
( ) ( )2 1
,j i
-D ; i.e., the interval from the time at which ( )1G  alone is 
satisfied to the time at which both ( )1G  and ( )2G  are satisfied. 
This analysis did not consider the time for ( )1G . 
In [16], Bissias et al. also considered the race between 
two PCPs. To derive an explicit formula of the probability 
distribution of AS time, they put in other conditions to end an 
attack attempt: the attack stops if either ( )H t  or ( )A t  
reaches 1BCN + , whichever happens first. In other words, the 
only way to succeed in an attack is that the fraudulent chain 
should mine 1BCN +  blocks faster than the public chain. On 
the contrary, in our model and in reality, an attack can be 
continued even at a moment when the public chain is ahead of 
the fraudulent chain, if it will give any profit. 
In [19], Karame et al. analyzed the first AS time under a 
fast-payment model which removed the block confirmation 
process by omitting condition ( )1G . 
IV. THE EXPECTED PROFIT OF A DS ATTACK 
The previous probabilistic analyses in [1] and [15] show 
that the success of DS attacks is not guaranteed when 
0.5Ap < . However, DS attacks with 0.5Ap <  might be 
pursued if they bring profit. 
A. Profitable DS Attacks 
Here, we analyze the profitability of DS attacks and to 
this end, we define profit function P  of DS attack 
( ), , ;A cut BCC p t NA  in terms of value C  of a fraudulent 
transaction, the block mining reward, and the operating 
expense (OPEX) of the computing power. We compute the 
expected profit function ( ), ;P A cut BCp t NE , which is the 
expectation of P . 
Definition 6 (Profitable Attacks). DS attack 
( ), , ;A cut BCC p t NA  is said to be profitable if and only if 
0P >E .  
 
The OPEX (e.g. the rental fee for the computing power) 
and the block mining reward are increased by the average 
block mining speed Al  by the attacker and the time t  
consumed during an attack. Thus, the OPEX and block 
mining rewards are expressed as functions ( ),AX tl  and 
( ),AR tl , respectively, which can be any increasing function 
(e.g., linear, exponential, or log) with respect to Al  and t . 
We define X  and R , respectively, as follows: 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 32 4, : log logA
t
A A x xX t t x x
l
l gl=  (35) 
 
for real constants 0g > , 1 2, 1x x > , and 3 4, 1x x > , and 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 32 4, : log logA
t
A A r rR t t r r
l
l bl=  (36) 
 
for real constants b , 1 2, 1r r > , and 3 4, 1r r > . 
To sum up, if an attack succeeds, the income from the AS 
is C as it is double-spent and the block mining reward R for 
time duration AST . In this case, the cost is the OPEX for 
duration AST . If the attack fails, the cost is the OPEX for 
duration cutt  without revenue. Hence, profit P of a DS attack 
is the random variable 
 
 ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
1 , 2, , ,  ,
:
, , .
A AS A AS cut
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C R T X T if T t
P
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l l
l
ì + - <ï= í -ïî
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Subsequently, the expected profit function of a DS attack is 
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 (38) 
where A A Tpl l=  and XE  is the expected OPEX defined as 
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Definition 6 and (38) imply that for fixed Ap  and cutt , DS 
attack ( ), , ;A cut BCA C p t N  is profitable if and only if 
Req.C C> , where the required value of target transaction 
Req.C  is 
 
( )
( ) ( )Req.
, ;
, .
, ;
X A cut BC
A AS
AS A cut BC
p t N
C R T
p t N
l= - é ùë û
E￿ EP  (40) 
 
Theorem 7. Suppose 1 2x x=  and 3 4x x=  in (35), and 
1 2r r=  and 3 4r r=  in (36). DS attack ( ), , ;A cut BCC p t NA  for 
( )0,0.5Ap Î  is profitable only if cutt < ¥ . In addition, let 
cutt = ¥  and ( )0.5,1Ap Î , then the required value of target 
transaction in (40) becomes 
 
 ( ) ( )( )Req. max 0, ; .AS ICTT A T A BCC p p Ng b l -= - E  (41) 
 
Proof: See Appendix C. 
 
By Theorem 7, setting cutt = ¥  and ( )0,0.5Ap Î  makes 
DS attack non-profitable. The following Theorem 8 shows 
that by setting a finite cutt , DS attacks ( ), , ;A cut BCC p t NA  
can be profitable not only for ( )0.5,1Ap Î , but also for 
( )0,0.5Ap Î . 
 
Theorem 8. Let 1 2x x=  and 3 4x x=  in (35), and 1 2r r=  
and 3 4r r=  in (36). Let ( );AS ICTcut T A BCt c p N-=￿ E  for a positive 
real c , where 
AS ICTT -
E  is given in (33). A DS attack 
( ), , ;A cut BCC p t NA  is profitable for any ( )0,1Ap Î , if 
Suf .C C>  , where  
 
 ( ) ( )( )Suf.
;
, ,
, ;
AS ICTT A T A BC
A
AS A cut BC
p p N
C p c
p t N
l
g -¢=
E
P  (42) 
and 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
;
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AS ICT A BC
A AS A cut BC
AS A cut BC
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Proof: See Appendix D. 
 
B. Profitable DS Attacks against Working Blockchain 
Networks 
As of 9th December 2018, we refer to blockchain 
explorers and nicehash.com (who provides the rental rates for 
borrowing computing power) to obtain block mining reward 
R  and OPEX X . The parameters 1 4, ,x xL  used in (35) are 
set to 1 2x x=  and 3 4x x= , which leads to a linear function 
TABLE I 
NUMERICAL COMPUTATIONS OF REQUIRED RESOURCES FOR PROFITABLE DS ATTACKS WHEN , FOR . 
Block Confirmation Number ( ) 1 3 5 7 9 
Computing Power ( ) 0.35 0.4 0.35 0.4 0.35 0.4 0.35 0.4 0.35 0.4 
Cut Time ( ) 
Scaled by 
 7.593 9.491 13.548 15.617 19.217 21.294 24.753 26.755 30.212 32.084 
AS Probability ( ) 0.389 0.523 0.286 0.440 0.217 0.380 0.167 0.332 0.130 0.292 
Expected AS Time 
( ) 
Scaled by 
 2.640 2.801 5.682 5.732 8.621 8.553 11.498 11.316 14.333 14.039 
Expected OPEX ( ) 
Scaled by 
 
3.050 3.993 6.085 7.513 9.110 10.973 12.135 14.423 15.153 17.874 
Required Value of Target 
Transaction ( ) 12.257 12.535 31.967 26.253 62.545 43.457 107.812 64.728 172.757 90.660 
 
X  with respect to Al  and AST . Analogously, the parameters 
for R  in (36) are set to 1 2r r=  and 3 4r r= , leading to a linear 
function R  with respect to Al  and AST . There are three 
more parameters: g , b , and 1Hl - . Parameter g  is the 
expected cost spent per generating a block and required for 
computing the expected OPEX. Parameter b  is the reward 
per generating a block. Parameter 1Hl -  is the average block 
generation time of the public chain. They are different by 
blockchain networks. 
We consider the Syscoin and BitcoinCash networks. The 
parameter g  is obtainable from nicehash.com. The two 
networks use the SHA-256 cryptographic puzzle for which 
the unit of computation is hash. The rental fee for 1P hashes 
per second for a day is around 0.04 BTC, which is around 
74.63 10-×  BTC per second. In other words, the rental fee is 
approximately 224.63 10-×  BTC per the computing of a hash. 
Once parameters b , g , and 1Hl -  are obtained, the 
required attack resources can be evaluated using Table I. 
Table I lists the required attack resources for each 0.35Ap =  
and 0.4Ap =  when AS ICTcut Tt c -= E , for 2c = .  
1) The Syscoin Network Parameters 
The average block generation time is fixed at 1 60Hl - =  
seconds. Referring to poolexplorer.com, the network’s 
computing speed is 7.6E hashes per second; i.e., 
7.6E 60=456E× solutions are needed to mine one block on 
average. Then, the parameter g  is obtained as 
 
 
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
224.63 10  BTC hash
  456E hashes block  mining
0.21 BTC block mining .
g -= ×
´
»
 (44) 
 
The reward b  per block mining is 38.5 SYS (without 
transaction fees), which is around 43.6 10-×  BTC per block 
mining. 
2) The BitcoinCash Network Parameters 
The average block generation time is fixed at 1 600Hl - =  
seconds. Referring to BTC.com, the network’s computing 
speed is 1.2E hashes per second; i.e., 1.2E 600=720E×  hashes 
are needed to generate one block on average. The parameter 
g  is obtained as 
 
 
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
224.63 10  BTC hash
   720E hashes block  mining
0.33 BTC block mining .
g -= ×
´
»
 (45) 
 
The reward b  per block mining is 12.5 BCH (without 
transaction fees), which is around 0.57 BTC per block mining. 
By Theorem 7, the relationship b g>  implies that the 
required value Req. 0C =  for DS attack ( ), , ;A cut BCC p t NA  
with 0.5Ap >  and cutt =¥  to be profitable is 0; i.e., such DS 
attacks are always profitable regardless of the value C  of 
target transaction. 
3) DS Attack with a Finite Cut Time and 0.5Ap <  
In Table II, we evaluate the resources required for 
profitable DS attacks using 0.35Ap =  against the two 
blockchain networks. The values in Table II are obtained 
from the values in Table I multiplied by scaling parameters g  
and 1Hl - . The results explain the importance of network 
parameter 1Hl - . Remember that Syscoin has a greater 
network computing power (7.6E hashes per second) than 
BitcoinCash (1.2E hashes per second). This implies that 
Syscoin has a higher rental fee per unit time for a same 
proportion of computing power than BitcoinCash. 
Specifically, when 0.35Ap = , the rental fee for Syscoin is 
163.69 BTC per day whereas that for BitcoinCash is 25.84 
BTC per day. Nevertheless, BitcoinCash requires higher 
OPEX for profitable DS attacks than Syscoin, since the 
higher 1Hl -  of BitcoinCash implies the higher g  (the 
average cost per block mining). In addition, a high 1Hl -  
proportionally delays the expected AS time. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
We showed that DS attacks using 50% or a less 
proportion of computing power can be profitable. For both 
the super-50% and the sub-50% proportion regimes, we 
provided quantitative resources required for profitable DS 
attacks. Specifically, we provided the probability for an AS 
success as well as the operating time and expense of mining 
rigs. We summarized the results in Table I, which enable the 
easy calculation of the minimum resources required for a 
profitable attack against any blockchain network. We showed 
examples of the calculations against working networks. 
Our results quantitatively show the importance of 
network policy. The less the average block mining period and 
block confirmation number, the less the minimum resources 
required for a profitable attack. That is to say, blockchain 
networks pursuing fast transaction speeds are risky. A way 
for developers of such networks to discourage DS attacks is, 
for example, to restrict the value of transactions depending on 
the network policy. If the value of the target transaction is 
limited below the minimum quantity we provided, attackers 
cannot expect to make a profit. 
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APPENDIX A  
PROOF OF COROLLARY 3 AND PROPOSITION 5 
A. Proof of Corollary 3 
We reduce the infinite summations in (15) into an 
algebraic form using generating functions.  
By substituting (16) into (15), the probability AS ICT-P  
becomes 
 
( )
2 1
2
1 ,22 1 2
2 1
1
1
1               .1
BC
BC BC
BC BC
BC
BC
N i
AS ICT A i A HN N jBCj N i N
N
iH
A
BCi NA
j p C p pN
p i pNp
¥ -
- - - -= = +
¥
= +
-æ ö= ç ÷-è ø
æ ö -æ ö+ç ÷ ç ÷-è øè ø
å å
å
P
  
(46) 
By rearranging the indices i  in the summations, we can 
obtain 
 
( )
2
,2
0
2
1
1
1 1 .1 1
BC
BC
BC
BC
BC
BC
BC BC
N
i N
AS ICT A i N j A H
BCj N i
N N
i iH
A A
BC BCi N i NA
j p C p pN
p i ip pN Np
¥
+
- -
= =
¥
= =
-æ ö= ç ÷-è ø
æ öæ ö - -æ ö æ ö+ -ç ÷ç ÷ ç ÷ ç ÷ç ÷- -è ø è øè ø è ø
å å
å å
P
  
(47) 
We define two generating functions as 
 ( ) ,
0
: ,ik i k
i
M x C x
¥
=
=å  (48) 
and 
 ( ): .ik
i k
iG x x
k
¥
=
æ ö= ç ÷è øå  (49) 
By substituting kM  and kG  into (47), we can write 
 
( ) ( )
( )
2
2
2
1
1
1
1 1
BC
BC
BC
BC
BC
BC
BC
BC
N
N
AS ICT A A H N j A H
BCj N
N N
iH
A N A A
BCi NA
j p p p M p pN
p ip G p pNp
- -
=
-
=
-æ ö= ç ÷-è ø
æ öæ ö -æ ö+ -ç ÷ç ÷ ç ÷ç ÷-è øè ø è ø
å
å
P
.
 (50) 
The function ( )kM x  is a generating function of the ballot 
numbers ,i kC , for which the algebraic expression given in [24] 
is 
 ( )
1
2 .
1 1 4
k
kM x x
+æ ö=ç ÷+ -è ø
 (51) 
Putting A Hx p p=  into ( )kM x  results in 
 
( )
( )
( )
1
1
1
1
2
1 1 4
2 , ,
1 1 4 1
2 ,
1 1 4 1
1 ,
k
k A H
A H
k
A H
A A
k
A H
H H
k
M
M p p
p p
p p
p p
p p
p p
p
+
+
+
+
æ ö
=ç ÷ç ÷+ -è ø
ìæ öïç ÷ <ïç ÷+ - -ïè ø=í
æ öï
ç ÷ ³ï
ç ÷+ - -ïè øî
æ ö
=ç ÷
è ø
 (52) 
where ( ): max ,M H Ap p p= . 
( )kG x  is a generating function of binomial coefficients, 
and the algebraic expression for it is given in [25]: 
 ( )
( ) 1
.
1
k
k k
xG x
x +
=
-
 (53) 
Putting Ax p=  into ( )kG x  results in 
 ( ) 1 .
k
A
k A H
H
pG p p
p
- æ ö= ç ÷
è ø
 (54) 
Substituting (52) and (54) into (50) arrives at 
 
( ) ( )
2
2 1
2
1
1
1          1 .1
BC
BC BC
BC
BC
BC
BC
N
N N j
AS ICT A A H M
BCj N
N N
iH
A
BCi NA
j p p p pN
p i pNp
- - +
-
=
=
-æ ö= ç ÷-è ø
æ ö -æ ö+ -ç ÷ ç ÷-è øè ø
å
å
P
 (55) 
We define ( ): min ,m A Hp p p= , then the relationship
A H m Mp p p p=  holds. By rearranging the order of operands, 
we can obtain 
 2 11 ,1
BC BC
BC
BC
AS ICT
N NN
j jmH A
A M
BCj N A M M
pp pj p pN p p p
-
=
=
æ öæ ö æ ö-æ öç ÷- -ç ÷ ç ÷ç ÷- ç ÷è ø è ø è øè ø
å
P
 (56) 
which is equal to (21). ■ 
B. Proof of Proposition 5 
We use the generating functions and their derivatives to 
compute the infinite summations in (32). 
By substituting (16) into (32) and rearranging the order of 
operands, we obtain 
 
( )
( )
( )
22
2 2
,22 2
1
1
2 1
1
1
1 11
              1 1
              1 .1
BC
AS ICT
BC BC
BC BC
BC BC
BC
BC
BC BC
BC
i iN
T T i A HN N jBCj N i N
i N N
A H
BCi N
N
i N N
A H
BCi N
j i C p pN
ii p pN
ii p pN
l
-
+¥
- -= =
¥
+ -
= -
-
+ -
= -
-æ ö= +ç ÷-è ø
æ ö+ + ç ÷-è ø
æ ö- + ç ÷-è ø
å å
å
å
E
(57) 
By rearranging the indices of summations, we arrive at 
 
( ) ( )
( )
2
1
,2
0
1
2
1
1
               2 2 1
               1
1
1
               
1
BC
BC BC
AS ICT
BC
BC
BC
BC
B
BC BC
BC
N
N N
T T A H
j N BC
i
BC i N j A H
i
N
iH
A A
i N BCA
N
i N N
A H
i N BC
j
p p
N
i N C p p
ipp i p
Np
i
i p p
N
l
-
+
=
¥
-
=
¥
= -
-
=
-æ ö= ç ÷-è ø
× + +
æ ö æ ö+ +ç ÷ ç ÷-è øè ø
-æ ö- ç ÷-è ø
å
å
å
E
.
C
å
 (58) 
By substituting generating functions ( )kM x  and ( )kG x  
defined respectively in (48) and (49), (58) becomes 
 
( )
( ) ( ))
( )
2
1
,2
0
2
1
1
1
1
              2
              2 1
              1
          
BC
BC BC
AS ICT
BC
BC
BC
BC
BC
BC
N
N N
T T A H
BCj N
i
i N j A H
i
BC N j A H
N
iH
A A N A
BCi NA
j p pN
iC p p
N M p p
p ip i p G pNp
l
-
+
=
¥
-
=
-
¥
-
= -
-æ ö= ç ÷-è ø
æ×çè
+ +
æ öæ ö æ ö+ +ç ÷ç ÷ ç ÷ç ÷-è øè ø è ø
å
å
å
E
2 1     1
BC
BC BC
BC
N
i N N
A H
BCi N
ii p pN
-
=
-æ ö- ç ÷-è øå
  
(59) 
 
We use the following relationships, 
 ( ),
0
i
i k k
i
iC x xM x
¥
=
¢=å  (60) 
and 
 ( ),i k
i k
ii x xG x
k
¥
=
æ ö ¢=ç ÷è øå  (61) 
and their derivatives are given by 
 
( ) ( )
( )
1
,
0
2
:
1 2
1 4 1 1 4
k k
i
i k
i
k
dM x M x
dx
iC x
k
x x
¥
-
=
+
¢ =
=
+ æ ö= ç ÷- + -è ø
å  (62) 
and 
 
( ) ( )
( )
( )
1
1
2
:
.
1
k k
i
i k
k k
k
dG x G x
dx
ii x
k
kx x
x
¥
-
=
-
+
¢ =
æ ö= ç ÷è ø
+
=
-
å  (63) 
By substituting (60) and (61) into (59), we obtain 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )
2
1
2 2
1 1
2
1         1
         2 2 1
         
1         1
AS ICT
BC
BC BC
BC
BC BC
BC
BC BC
BC
BC BC
BC
T T
N
N N
A H
BCj N
A H N j A H BC N j A H
N
H
A A N A N A
A
N
i N N
A H
BCi N
j p pN
p p M p p N M p p
pp p G p G p
p
ii p pN
l
-
+
=
- -
- -
-
=
=
-æ ö
ç ÷-è ø
¢× + +
æ ö ¢+ +ç ÷
è ø
-æ ö- ç ÷-è ø
å
å
E
  
(64) 
Putting A Hx p p=  into ( )kM x¢  results in 
 
( ) ( )
( ) 21 1 .
1 2
k A H k m M
k
m M
M p p M p p
k
p p
+
¢ ¢=
+ æ ö
= ç ÷- è ø
 (65) 
Putting Ax p=  into ( )kG x¢  gives 
 ( ) ( )
1
2 .
k k
A A
k A k
H
kp p
G p
p
-
+
+
¢ =  (66) 
By substituting (52), (54), (65), and (66) into (64), we finally 
obtain (33). ■ 
APPENDIX B  
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4 
We use a generating function and generalized 
hypergeometric functions to compute the infinite summations 
in (24). 
By substituting ( )Pr I iÎΔ W  in (16) and ( )iTf t  in (25) 
into (24), we arrive at 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )
1 , 2
1 1 12
2 2
1 ,22 1 2
1
2 1
1
1   1 1 !
1                      .1 1 !
TBC
BC BC
BC BC
T
BC BC
BC
AS ICTT
i i ti ij N
T
i A HN N jBCj N i N
ti i
N i N T
H A
BCi N
f t t
t ej C p pN i
t ei p pN i
l
l
d
l
l
-
+ - --= ¥
- - -= = +
--¥
-
= +
- - -¥ =
-æ ö
ç ÷- -è ø
-æ ö+ ç ÷- -è ø
å å
å
P
  
(67) 
By rearranging the indices of summations and the order of 
operands, we obtain 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
(
( )
1 , 2
2
1
,2
0
2 2 1 2 2
1
1
1     1
                                
2 2 !
1     1
BC
BC BC
BC
BC
BC BC T
BC
T
AS ICTT
j N
N i N i
i N j A H
BCj N i
N i N i t
T
BC
N i i
t iH T
A
BCA
f t t
j D p pN
t e
N i
p tie pNp i
l
l
d
l
l
-
= ¥
+ + +
-
= =
+ + + -
-
-
- - -¥ =
-æ ö
ç ÷-è ø
ö
× ÷÷+ ø
æ ö -æ ö+ç ÷ ç ÷-è øè ø
å å
P
( )
( )
12
1 !
1                             .1 1 !
BC
BC
BC
i N
i iN
i T
A
BCi N
ti pN i
l
¥
=
-
=
æ
çç -è
ö-æ ö- ÷ç ÷ ÷- -è ø ø
å
å
 (68) 
We can define two generating functions as  
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )
,2
0
0
:
2 2 !
2 2 !
2 1 ,
! 2 1 ! 2 2 !
BC
i
i N j
i BC
i
BC
BC
i BC BC
xB x C
N i
i N j xN j
i i N j N i
¥
-
=
¥
=
=
+
+ -
= - +
+ - + +
å
å
 (69) 
and 
 
( ) ( )
1
1
1: 1 1 !
.1 !
BC
BC
i
BCi N
i
BCi N
i xH x N i
i x
N i
-¥
=
¥
= -
-æ ö= ç ÷- -è ø
æ ö= ç ÷-è ø
å
å
 (70) 
By substituting ( )B x  and ( )H x  into (68), we obtain 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
1 , 2
2
2 2
12
1
1
1
1 .1 1 !
BC BC
T
BC
BC
BC
T
BC
AS ICTT
j N N
t
A T A H T A H T
BCj N
N i iN
t iH T
A T A T A
BCi NA
f t t
j p e p p t B p p tN
p tie p H p t pNp i
l
l
d
l l l
ll l
-
=
-
=
-
-
=
- - -¥ =
-æ ö
ç ÷-è ø
æ öæ ö -æ ö+ -ç ÷ç ÷ ç ÷ç ÷- -è øè ø è ø
å
å
P
  
(71) 
 
We replace function ( )B x  in (69) with the generalized 
hypergeometric functions defined in Appendix E. For this 
purpose, we first denote the sequences in ( )B x  by 
 
( )
( ) ( )
2 2 ! 1 ,
! 2 1 ! 2 2 !
BC
i
BC BC
i N j
i i N j N i
b
+ -
=
+ - + +
 (72) 
and 
 ( )( )0
1 .
2 1 2 !BC BCN j N
b =
- +
 (73) 
Next, the function ( )B x  can be rewritten as  
 
( ) ( )
( )
0
0 1 21 2 1
0
0 1 0
2 1
2 1 .
i
BC i
i
BC
B x N j x
N j x x x
b
b b bb
b b b
¥
=
= - +
æ ö
= - + + + +ç ÷
è ø
å
L
 (74) 
The reformulated sequence in (74) is computed by 
 
( )( )
( )( )( )( )
1 1 2 1 2 2 ,
2 2 1 1 2 1
BC BCi
i BC BC BC
i N j i N j
i N j i N i N i
b
b
+ + + - + + -=
+ + - + + + + +
 (75) 
which has 2 polynomials in i  on the numerator and 3 
polynomials in i  on the denominator, except for ( )1i+ . By 
the definition of the generalized hypergeometric function 
[22], function ( )B x  can be expressed as 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
0 2 3
2 3
2 1  ; ;
1  ; ; ,
2 !
BC j j
j j
BC
B x N j F x
F x
N
b= - +
=
a b
a b  (76) 
where vectors ja  and jb  respectively defined in (27) and 
(28) are the constants in the polynomials in i  of the 
numerator and denominator in (75), respectively. 
We use a closed-form expression of generating function 
( )H x  in (70) given by 
 
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )
1
1
1
0
1
1 !
1
1 ! 1 !
1 ! !
,
1 !
BC
BC
BC
BC
i
BCi N
i
i NBC BC
N i
iBC
N
x
BC
i xH x N i
x
N i N
x x
N i
x e
N
¥
= -
¥
= -
- ¥
=
-
æ ö= ç ÷-è ø
=
- - +
=
-
=
-
å
å
å
 (77) 
where the following relationship is used [26]: 
 
0
.
!
i
x
i
x e
i
¥
=
=å  (78) 
By substituting (76) and (77)  into (67), we arrive at 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )( )
( )
( )( )
( )
( )
1 , 2
2
2
2
2 3
1
1
2 !
1      ; ;1
    
1 !
1                             1
BC
T
BC
BC
BC BC
T A T
N
t
A T A H T
AS ICTT
BC
j N
j j A H T
BCj N
N N
A Tt p tH
A T
A BC
i
i T
A
BC
p e p p t
f t t
N
j F p p tN
p tp e p e
p N
ti pN
l
l l
l l
d
l
l
l
l
-
-
=
=
-
-
- - -¥ =
-æ ö× ç ÷-è ø
ææ ö ç+ç ÷ ç -è ø è
-æ ö- ç ÷-è ø
å a b
P
( )
( )( )
( )
( )( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
12
2
2
2
2 3
1
12
1 !
2 !
1  ; ;1
1 !
1                        
1 ! !
BC
BC
BC
T
BC
BC
BC BC
T A T
BC
BC
iN
i N
N
t
A T A H T
BC
j N
j j A H T
BCj N
N N
A Tt p tH
A T
A BC
i iN
i T
A
i NBC BC
i
p e p p t
N
j F p p tN
p tp e p e
p N
tp
N i N
l
l l
l l
l
l
l
l
-
=
-
=
=
-
-
-
=
ö
÷÷- ø
=
-æ ö× ç ÷-è ø
ææ ö ç+ç ÷ ç -è ø è
ö
-
- -
å
å
å
a b
.÷÷ø
  
(79) 
We obtain (26) by rearranging the indices of the summations 
and the order of operands.  ■ 
APPENDIX C  
PROOF OF THEOREM 7 
When 1 2x x= , 3 4x x= , 1 2r r= , and 3 4r r= , the OPEX 
and block mining reward respectively turn into 
 ( ),A AS A ASX T Tl gl=  (80) 
and 
 ( ), .A AS A ASR T Tl bl=  (81) 
Combining these conditions implies that expected OPEX 
XE  defined in (39) becomes 
 
( )
( ) ( )
( )( )
, ;
, ; , ;
   1 , ; .
AS
X A cut BC
AS A cut BC A T A cut BC
AS A cut BC A cut
p t N
p t N p t N
p t N t
gl
gl
=
+ -
E
P E
P
 (82) 
For ( )0,0.5Ap Î , 1AS <P  always holds, since AS AS ICT-£P P  
by the definition and 1AS ICT- <P  by (21). Thus, if cutt = ¥ , 
the expected OPEX in (82) diverges to minus infinity. In 
other words, the expected profit PE  in (38) with 
( )0,0.5Ap Î  is positive only if cutt < ¥ . 
We next derive the sufficient and necessary condition (41) 
for ( )0.5,1Ap Î  and cutt = ¥ . When cutt = ¥ , AS AS ICTT T -=  
and AS AS ICT-=P P  by the definition of AS-ICT. In addition, 
( )0,0.5Ap Î  implies 1AS ICT- =P  by (21). In this case, by 
substituting (80) and (81), the expected profit PE  in (38) 
becomes 
 ( ) ( ) ( ), ; ; .
AS ICTP A BC A T A BC
p N C p Nb g l
-
¥ = + -E E  (83) 
Hence, 0P >E  if and only if the value C  of target 
transaction is greater than Req.C  given in (41). ■ 
APPENDIX D  
PROOF OF THEOREM 8 
We obtain an upper bound Suf.C  of Req.C  in (40). If 
Suf.C C>  then Req.C C> , which implies that a DS attack 
( ), , ;AS ICTA T BCC p c N-EA  for a positive real number c  is 
profitable. 
As ( ),A ASR Tlé ùë ûE in (40) is nonnegative by the definition 
of function R , we arrive at the upper bound: 
 
( )
( )Req.
, ;
.
, ;
X A cut BC
AS A cut BC
p t N
C
p t N
£
E
P  (84) 
By substituting 
AS ICTcut T
t c
-
= E , 1 2x x= , and 3 4x x= , the 
expected OPEX XE  in (84) becomes 
 
( ) ( )
( )( )
, ; , ;
                    1 , ; .
AS ICT AS ICT AS
AS ICT AS ICT
X A T BC AS A T BC A T
AS A T BC A T
p c N p c N
p c N c
gl
gl
- -
- -
=
+ -
E E P E E
P E E  
 (85) 
We use the following relationship on the conditional 
expectation  
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
1 , 21 , 2 00
lim
, ; , ;
;
; .
, ;
cut
AS
AS ICT
xt
TT x
T
AS A cut BC AS A cut BC
AS ICT A BC
T A BC
AS A cut BC
tf t dttf t dt
p t N p t N
p N
p N
p t N
-
-
®¥
-
= £
=
òòE P P
P EP
 (86) 
By substituting (85) and (86) into (84), we finally obtain the 
upper bound Suf.C  given in (42). ■ 
APPENDIX E  
THE GENERALIZED HYPERGEOMETRIC FUNCTION 
A generalized hypergeometric series [22] is a power 
series 
0
n
nn
zb
³å , where the ratio of coefficients are 
expressed by polynomials ( )A n  and ( )B n  in n  as follows: 
 
( )
( )( )
1 ,
1
n
n
A n
B n n
b
b
+ =
+
 (87) 
for all integers 0n ³ . The polynomials are written by 
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 pA n c a n a n= + +L  (88) 
and 
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 .qB n d b n b n= + +L  (89) 
 
The generalized hypergeometric series is denoted by 
 ( ); ; ,p qF za b  (90) 
where a  and b  are vectors of 1, , pa aL  and 1, , qb bL , 
respectively. 
A generalized hypergeometric series defines a 
generalized hypergeometric function if it converges. If 
1p q< + , then the ratio of coefficients (87) goes to zero as 
n ® ¥ , which implies that the series converges for any finite 
value z  and thus defines the function. 
 
 
